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Why They Hate Us: An Empirical Study of Individuals’ Anti-American Attitudes
Abstract
Prior to September 11, 2001, the United States was perceived as a predominant, nearly untouchable
power. The collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War spelled the end of a bi-polar world and
the beginning of the age of a single global superpower. The twentieth century was “the American century
[. . .] not only in military, but also in economic, technological, and even cultural terms” (Krastev 5).However,
in the years since September 11, hostility towards the United States has increased drastically.“Three years
on, it seems that we are all anti-Americans.Hostility to the United States is deeper and broader than at any
point in the last fifty years” (Zakaria 1). This increasing anti-Americanism can be seen around the globe,
and has spurred lengthy journalistic and academic inquiries within the United States focused on “why they
hate us,” often without a specific definition of who they are or a definition of anti-American attitudes.While
the lack of existing empirical research and the potential for furthering stereotypes are obvious deterrents
from this type of research, examining anti-American attitudes on an individual level cross-nationally can
provide preliminary answers to these important questions.
This paper will examine demographic and attitudinal information from around the world and address
empirically why individuals seem to be increasingly anti-American. By shedding light on individual traits
that contribute to anti-Americanism, policy makers may be able to develop strategies to target the root
causes of anti-American attitudes. Examining these questions from an empirical perspective provides
theoretical and practical support for policy decisions and may introduce more complete answers to
questions regarding attitudes, terrorism, and global cohesion than questions asked and answered
rhetorically on the evening news.
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Why They Hate Us: An Empirical Study of Individuals’
Anti-American Attitudes
Amy Buenning
Prior to September 11, 2001, the United States was perceived as a predominant, nearly
untouchable power. The collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War spelled the
end of a bi-polar world and the beginning of the age of a single global superpower. The
twentieth century was “the American century [. . .] not only in military, but also in economic, technological, and even cultural terms” (Krastev 5). However, in the years since
September 11, hostility towards the United States has increased drastically. “Three years on,
it seems that we are all anti-Americans. Hostility to the United States is deeper and broader
than at any point in the last fifty years” (Zakaria 1). This increasing anti-Americanism can
be seen around the globe, and has spurred lengthy journalistic and academic inquiries
within the United States focused on “why they hate us,” often without a specific definition
of who they are or a definition of anti-American attitudes. While the lack of existing empirical research and the potential for furthering stereotypes are obvious deterrents from this
type of research, examining anti-American attitudes on an individual level cross-nationally
can provide preliminary answers to these important questions.
This paper will examine demographic and attitudinal information from around the
world and address empirically why individuals seem to be increasingly anti-American. By
shedding light on individual traits that contribute to anti-Americanism, policy makers may
be able to develop strategies to target the root causes of anti-American attitudes. Examining
these questions from an empirical perspective provides theoretical and practical support for
policy decisions and may introduce more complete answers to questions regarding attitudes, terrorism, and global cohesion than questions asked and answered rhetorically on the
evening news.
Process
Despite the passionate debate that has emerged about the causes of anti-Americanism,
empirical research on anti-Americanism is surprisingly unavailable. There is an area of
political writing devoted to explaining the causes and history of anti-Americanism. These
include: a possible increase in American isolationism (Biden), a distraction from internal
domestic problems (Rubin 2002; Fabbrini), a response to stereotypes and preconceptions
about America that have evolved over time (Ceaser), a response to the war in Iraq (Pew
2004, A Year After the Iraq War), and a phenomenon partially generated by biased global
news sources (Lambert). More recent works cover the history of anti-American sentiment
around the globe (Rubin 2004, Revel), detail anti-American sentiment by region and country (Ross), and attempt to understand the phenomenon by comparing attitudes abroad
through comparison. Some of this research points to exacerbating influences in the domestic United States (Hollander). However, no theoretical articles address why an individual is
more or less likely to develop attitudes that are anti-American.
Since this study attempts to predict which individuals are likely to develop antiAmerican attitudes it draws on a number of areas of related theoretical literature to discern
the relationship of the individual to anti-Americanism. However, there is a lack of a holistic,
clearly defined literature related to the subject matter. The hypothesis will be guided by
responses to globalization and imperialism, the potential religious causes of conflict, psychological causes of ethnocentric attitudes, and literature related to individual attitudes
regarding foreign states and foreign policy. Combining these theoretical areas opens up a
window into understanding individuals and their attitudes towards America, despite the
lack of a more general theoretical approach.
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Propositions
In order to empirically test individuals’ attitudes towards America, useful survey data
must be used that is both cross-national and includes questions about the United States.
The Pew Research Center has attempted to glean attitudes about U.S. policies and positions
from over 38,000 people from 44 nations via annual studies reporting on the critical assessments of individuals regarding key policies and general impressions of the United States.
Using their 2002 data, this paper will address consistent patterns of anti-Americanism that
are not limited to country or geographic region, but rather to individuals. Questions related
to individuals and their demographic traits will be the independent variables, while an attitudinal scale for anti-Americanism based on survey questions will make up the dependent
variable. This should uncover trends based on identity that create a greater likelihood of
anti-Americanism that is separate from nationality.
Previous Research
Anti-Americanism is first and foremost a particular type of prejudice directed at
Americans. Rubin defines the phenomenon as:
an antagonism to the United States that is systematic, seeing it as completely and inevitably evil; a view that greatly exaggerates America’s
shortcomings; a deliberate misrepresentation of the nature or policies of
the United States for political purposes; [and a] misperception of
American society, policies, or goals which falsely portrays them as
ridiculous or malevolent (Rubin 2004, ix).
This stereotype of Americans is likely due to an oversimplification of the complexities that
define “America.” Individuals often oversimplify and distort issues by thinking in categories
(Beck). Since this categorization is a building block of prejudice, it is necessary to examine
the sources of prejudice, and the theoretical literature that details why people identify with
a particular group in developing attitudes.
Anti-Americanism: A Response to Imperialism?
In this context, it is important to consider the historical effects of globalization and
theories addressing the frustrated response to modernization in any discussion of antiAmericanism. This frustration is manifested via aggression towards the United States. Many
theorists claim frustration emerges when mobilization and modernization outpace assimilation within a particular country or culture. Modernization, in many cases, causes social
mobilization at an unprecedented pace; creating expectations of social mobility and the
breakdown of traditional order at the same time communication and transportation
resources are revolutionized. The result is an increased awareness of poverty and inadequacy of resources, or a desire to grasp the benefits of globalization. This “revolution of rising
expectations” is quickly met by the reality of slow economic growth and unequal distribution of benefits results in a “revolution of rising frustration” which can, in turn, lead to
aggression or anti-Americanism (Taras and Ganguly 11).
Gurr, who best known for developing the theory of relative deprivation in Why Men
Rebel, further developed this theory. Relative deprivation theory suggests that revolution
and rebellion are caused when there is a “perceived discrepancy between value expectations
and value expectancies in a society” (Taras and Ganguly 15). According to Gurr, people recognize general deprivation, and become aware that their own circumstances are not universal, discern that their own deprivation is unfair, and decide that political action must be
taken to end their plight (Taras and Ganguly). While anti-Americanism does not necessarily lead to rebellion or specific political action, the same cognitive processes, triggered by an
individual realization of one’s relative deprivation, is likely.
Other research suggests that especially in Arab nations, anti-Americanism is a product
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of manipulative and controlling governments that “use anti-Americanism as a foil to distract public attention from other, far more serious problems with those societies” (Rubin
2002, 1). Many governments take advantage of rising expectations, globalization, and relative deprivation by blaming slow economic progress and problems on the United States. If
this theory holds true, then many people interviewed in the Pew Survey may be discontent
with their life situation and blame the United States more than their own government for
their hardship, especially in the Middle East. In order to control for this scenario, the
Middle East will be added as a control variable.
Religion As a Source of Conflict
In his controversial work The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order,
Samuel Huntington identifies religion as one of the primary sources of conflict global conflict (Huntington). Huntington categorizes conflict as a clash of civilizations, which he
defines as the broadest cultural framework for identity. “Political boundaries increasingly
are redrawn to coincide with cultural ones: ethnic, religious, and civilizational [. . .] and the
fault lines between civilizations are becoming the central lines of conflict in global politics”
(Huntington 125). A great deal of support for religion as a cultural basis for civilization
conflict emerges from recent conflict between what Huntington calls the “Islamic World”
and the “West.” If Huntington’s thesis is correct, and religion forms a basis for political and
cultural identity, than religious differences are partly responsible for global conflict and
aggression. This is a strong indicator that Anti-Americanism may be fueled by religious differences.
However, others have been critical of Huntington’s thesis, despite agreement that the
historical relationship between Islam and Western style Christianity has not been promising
(Esposito 46). Instead of religion, Piscatori attributes conflict to more traditional patterns of
nation-state behavior. “The astute observer of international relations will note that there is
no such thing as monolithic Islam [. . .] Islam has become nationalized, producing as many
Islams as there are countries with Muslim majorities.” According to Piscatori, national identity would often trump religious and cultural identity, especially due to the lack of consistency within faith traditions. Given the controversy in the literature, this study will examine
if, on an individual level, religion has an impact in shaping attitudes regarding “other” civilizations.
Social Identity Theory
Conflict results only if individuals separate their individual identity from the source of
their perceived problem. In the 1970s Henri Tajfel developed a sophisticated model for how
subjects identify themselves in relation to others, which became known as the “minimal
group paradigm” (Tajfel). Tajfel attempted to recreate the first meeting between and individual and their "alter" in a state of nature. This involved minimizing group identification, history, competition over resources, distrust, self-interest, or contact (Mercer). Tajfel divided
his subjects into two groups arbitrarily and studied the subjects’ decisions regarding fairness, maximum joint gain, relative gain, and absolute gain towards their own group (what
Tajfel calls the “in-group”) and the other group (the “out-group”) (Mercer). The results
showed that individuals consistently favored their own group and tried to maximize the
difference in scores between the in-group and the out-group (Fisher). Conflict and cooperation is decided based on this initial perception of “self ” and “other.”
In order to identify self, the categorization of other is necessary. Not only is a self and
an other identified, but the definition of self is also associated with positive images to reinforce a more positive social identity in comparison to others. This is referred to as a “universal desire for self esteem” (Mercer). Discriminatory behavior, and presumably antiAmerican sentiment, can be found in subjects’ efforts to give their own group a greater rela-
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tive value (Mercer). Unfortunately, social identity theory does not provide a key for which
self-categorizations are the most important, and therefore the basis for identity.
Psychological Causes of Ethnic Conflict
In addition to research on social identity theory, theories that explain the psychological causes of ethnic conflict provide further insight into individuals’ anti-American attitudes. Sumner developed some of his first theory using in-group and out-group characteristics in defining what he called the “universal syndrome of ethnocentrism” (Levine 7).
Robert Levine and Donald Campbell use Sumner’s research combined with the work of
other theorists to generate a list of attitudes and behaviors consistent with the in-group and
out-group, and empirically test these theories against each other to determine a better
roadmap to ethnocentric conflict. They suggested that the in-group generally sees the outgroup as contemptible, immoral, inferior, weak, resists cooperation, lacks obedience to outgroup authorities, blames the out-group for in-group problems, and is fearful and distrustful of the out-group (Levine). This ingroup-outgroup mentality could be applied to antiAmericanism, a form of ethnocentrism that focuses on a particular out-group.
After testing these theories, Levine and Campbell found areas of unchallenged agreement amongst theorists. They concluded that competition over resources generates conflict,
and could potentially cause anti-Americanism. In addition, reciprocation or perceived
reciprocation of hostilities generates aggression. The tendency for in-groups to magnify
cognitively their differences from the out-group and exaggerate the out-group flaws generates further conflict. Finally, Levine and Campbell concluded that complex societies generally contain greater ethnocentrism (Levine). All of these theoretical consistencies are relatively straightforward, except for the last proposition. Since regions with longer histories
have developed more complex group structures and coordination, they propose that this
results in more out-group hostility, based on a longer history of distinguishing those that
“belonged” with “outsiders.”
Theory Regarding Individuals
To identify which individual traits shape individual conceptions of themselves and
“America,” this paper will turn to piecemeal research in other areas. Existing research shows
that isolationism generally appeals to the poorly educated, economically deprived, and geographically isolated individuals, who are also generally poorly informed regarding global
events. (Sniderman and Citrin). This suggests that a person’s educational level and economic status are highly influential factors in defining differences between themselves and “others.” This is consistent with Lambert’s work suggesting that news sources and bias of news
media impacts the misunderstandings between the United States and the rest of the world
(Lambert). Where individuals obtain their news information, their education level, and economic status will likely directly affect their attitudes towards the United States.
An individual’s history of travel to other states or familial contact individuals have
outside their own nation, especially with the United States, adds insight to the creation of
individual attitudes. Research suggests that foreign travel on the part of businessmen tends
to reinforce previously held conceptions regarding the visited state and peoples. However,
such travel also makes individuals aware of the differences between their own identity and
opinions and those of others, which can result in greater understanding (Pool, Keller,
Bauer). Logically, an isolated individual is likely to have different attitudes towards America
than a well-traveled individual from the same nation.
The existing literature further suggests that foreign policy attitudes differ between men
and women. Pomper drew conclusions that elections in the United States in both 1980 and
1984 were influenced by a gender gap over opinions regarding war and foreign policy
between men and women (Togeby). Some researchers have concluded that on 6% of issues
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involving force in foreign policy between 1964 and 1983, there was a consistent gender difference in opinions (Togeby). However, Lisa Togeby re-examined the issue using a different
country, Denmark, and found that, “differences between the genders are not large, but they
are consistent and significant “(Togeby 388). Given a slight gender gap in foreign policy attitudes in multiple countries, it will be important to note if gender plays a role in antiAmerican sentiment.
The wide range of existing research on globalization, the psychological sources of ethnic conflict, social identity theory and as well as indications from existing research indicating the sources of individual attitudes creates a compelling case for examining individuals’
levels of anti-Americanism.
Data and Hypothesis
The Pew Research Center’s data covers individuals in 44 countries cross nationally 1. A
five-question Likert scale was developed to measure the dependent variable, antiAmericanism 2. Using questions in the survey, independent variables were selected focusing
on an individual’s sources of news, gender, age, travel background, relatives living in foreign
nations, religious activity, education, employment status, availability of necessities, income
level, amenities, marital status, children, self-identification on a political spectrum, and population of their town 3. Each variable was measured by one or more questions from the Pew
Research Center’s survey, although many had differing scales of measurement.
Existing research allows extrapolation of a number of preliminary hypotheses:
1. A lower education level increases individuals’ anti-American attitudes.
2. Lower levels of income generate greater anti-Americanism.
3. Economic deprivation (as measured by amenities and necessities) results in greater
levels of anti-Americanism
4. A gender gap exists between male and female levels of anti-Americanism, with males
presenting a higher level of ant-Americanism
5. Rural areas will contain individuals with higher levels of anti-Americanism
6. Traveling and exposure to other nations/cultures, especially the United States,
will generate lower levels of anti-Americanism.
7. Muslim and non-Christian faiths will coincide with higher levels of Anti-Americanism.
8. The lack of an international news source (or the presence of less-sophisticated news
sources will result in higher levels of Anti-Americanism.
Testing these hypotheses and teasing out other unpredicted relationships between an
individual’s level of anti-Americanism and their identity was done utilizing a number of
statistical tools. Bivariate correlations illustrated connections between the dependent and
independent variables, while controlling for statistical significance. Finally, linear regression
analysis was used to uncover direct relationships between identity and anti-Americanism
drawing from a single survey question for each independent variable 4.
The variables for the study were chosen without bias to particular survey questions
and, as a result, data problems emerged when independent variables were selected from the
existing research. Each country had the ability to exclude or reword survey questions 5. In
addition, the Pew Research Center used a variety of coding techniques, which were mostly
consistent, but occasionally varied widely from country to country. For example, comparing
1 Appendix 1
2 Appendix 2
3 Appendix 2
4 These were usually the strongest questions with a statistically significant correlation to Anti-Americanism
or the only questions that acted as a measure of a particular variable. See Table 12 for the regression model.
5 Appendix 1
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income levels cross-nationally became impossible, because the data was coded according to
a scale of country specific currencies. However, income and economic deprivation were
measured using the series of questions addressing basic needs in all countries survey, and
amenities in lesser-developed countries. A similar problem emerged when a variation in the
coded responses was discovered regarding an individual’s occupation, making cross-national comparisons too difficult for this study. Knowing these two facts about any individual in
the study has the potential to affect the results, but since the measurements are impossible
to compare, they have been dropped from the research. The last coding problem was
addressed by combining the responses to one of the education measures through a recode,
allowing a comparison regarding level of education to be drawn from the data set.
The other difficulty of this study is the inability to account completely for an individual’s response to global events or any psychological trauma they may have experienced. An
excellent example of psychological effects altering the results would be individuals’ with low
self-esteem. As Sniderman and Citron point out in their research, individuals with low self
esteem, “are likely to see their external environment as confused and threatening” (410).
However, individual psychology alone does not tell a complete story. Hopefully, the data
will show connections between demographics and eliminate statistical noise caused by significant world events, and provide insight into causes of anti-Americanism separate from
individual psychology.
An individual’s anti-American attitudes might be amplified by country-level contact
with the United States. For that reason, control variables were added for region. Controls
were also established to remove any bias based on Muslim/non-Muslim to further eliminate
noise in the dataset caused by the Middle East that was suggested in the literature. The final
control was developed to replace the gender variable once it was found to be largely
insignificant. These controls were added to the regression analysis.
Results and Analysis
The results turned up high levels of statistical significance, but with relatively weak
correlations 6. In terms of the first hypothesis, education was found to have a negative correlation to anti-Americanism (Table 1) 7, confirming Sniderman and Citrin’s theory that low
levels of education correspond with higher levels of isolationism. Additionally, those that
completed their education at a younger age had higher levels of anti-Americanism (Table
1), which was also statistically significant. Both of these findings strengthen the argument
that ethnocentric and isolationist attitudes are less prevalent among the educated. In this
study, isolationist attitudes are measured vis a vis the dependent variable.
In terms of economic deprivation, the presence of necessities (Table 2) and amenities
in lesser-developed countries resulted in positive correlations (Table 3). This was surprising,
as it ran contradictory to the hypothesis, which generally suggested that lower economic
status would generate greater levels of anti-Americanism. The data instead marginally suggests that the presence of basic necessities and amenities encourages anti-Americanism.
While this seems to run contrary to existing research, it does not rule out theories of relative deprivation. Relative deprivation theory does not specify which possessions or economic position create a self-awareness of deprivation. Globalization potentially creates
expectations above and beyond basic necessities and amenities. Instead of defining deprivation by the lack of food, clothing and shelter, it is defined by the absence of prosperity on an
American economic scale. Since economic status could only be measured using limited
6 Often variables were coded where “no” responses corresponded with a value of “2” and “yes” as a value
of one. The data is presented in its original form, before being inversely interpreted for this data problem. This accounts for the inconsistencies between the data tables and the findings
7 Tables in Appendix 4
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indicators, the results of the correlation on these variables cannot provide a complete picture, and ideally further study on income levels, relative deprivation, and economic status in
relation to anti-Americanism should be conducted.
Hypothesis number four, predicting a gender gap for anti-Americanism, was not supported by the results. In this case, the nonparametric correlation between the independent
and dependent was not statistically significant (Table 4). However, when the gender variable
was analyzed by region, gender was significant in both North and South America, and the
Middle East (Table 5 & 6). In the Americas, women were very slightly more anti-American
than men, whereas in the Middle East this was almost the exact opposite. Given the contradictory literature regarding foreign policy attitudes and gender, it is not surprising that two
different regions had inverse gender relationships to anti-Americanism. However, it is
important to remember that neither correlation was very strong.
Analysis of the population size of the town confirmed hypothesis five. Here again the
correlation was very weak (Table 7). Individuals that lived in smaller towns were found to
be slightly more likely to have anti-American attitudes. However, some of the countries had
variations on this question, and since not all of the states in the study were included in this
variable due to reformatted questions, this relationship may be stronger if given further
research. Regardless, it seems to suggest once again that Sniderman and Citrin were correct
in proposing that more isolated individuals have more isolationist attitudes.
In terms of traveling abroad, contact with the United States seemed to have a stronger
impact on anti-Americanism than many of the other variables. While the time elapsed since
travel was found to be statistically insignificant, travel to the United States was negatively
correlated to anti-Americanism (Table 8). In addition, the presence of relatives or friends
abroad, especially in the United States, significantly decreased the level of antiAmericanism. The statistically significant, negative correlation between the presence of
friends and relatives abroad in the United States and anti-Americanism was the strongest
relationship uncovered in this study (Table 8). This reinforces the theory that travel has an
impact on foreign policy attitudes, but since the existing research states that travel usually
reinforced existing preconceptions, the findings do not contribute extensively to existing literature. However, the extant literature did not address contact with friends or relatives
abroad. It was included in this study as part of the travel abroad category, since contact with
friends and neighbors in many cases may be the only international contact individuals
have. It is interesting that the presence of friends and relatives was a stronger determinant
of anti-Americanism than personal travel to the United States. However, this is easily
explained since those that have friends and relatives in the United States may consider their
contacts part of their “in-group.” Including Americans in one’s own framing of identity
would clearly lessen the likelihood of anti-Americanism according to social identity theory
and the self-esteem hypothesis.
Hypothesis seven addressed Huntington’s thesis, that religion generates conflict, on the
individual level. The hypothesis focused on those with non-Christian faiths, specifically
Muslims, who are historically the most likely to come into conflict with the United States.
As individuals self-identified their religious background, bivariate correlations could not be
run on the nominal level variables. Instead, the mean levels of Americanism for each religion were compared 8. As shown, Muslim and Eastern Orthodox individuals have higher
average levels of anti-Americanism than the other religions (Table 9). As Eastern
Orthodoxy is a form of Christianity, these results are somewhat surprising, until one considers the history of the Cold War and Communism in the same region of the world where
8 This variable was also recoded to combine similar faith categories. Thus, all denominations of
Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, etc. were combined. Faith traditions that did not fit
in these categories were placed in “other,” and the respondents who identified as “no faith” were combined with atheist/no religion.
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Eastern Orthodoxy is prominent. The historical conflict between the former Soviet Union
and the United States likely explains the higher levels of anti-Americanism. However, the
same historical conflict exists between the United States and Islamic states. Before conclusions are drawn about the impact of faith, specifically the Muslim religion, regression analysis will compare the significance of this variable to the others.
Determining the importance of religious activity to individuals was the other method
of analyzing religion as an explanatory variable. If Huntington’s thesis is correct, highly
active religious participants are more likely to identify themselves by their faith. To test this,
the impact of their participation in religious traditions was measured against antiAmericanism. The bivariate correlation shows that, in both Muslim and non-Muslim faiths,
as respondents were more active in prayer, anti-Americanism dropped slightly. This corresponds with lower levels of anti-Americanism among participants who identified religion
as important in their life (Table 10). While these correlations are extremely weak, they suggest that religious participation does not generate higher levels of Anti-Americanism.
However, that does not disprove Huntington’s theory that religion helps to shape identity,
and therefore causes conflict.
Hypothesis eight dealt with sources of news, by drawing on the work of Lambert, who
suggests that biases in foreign news and sources of news are part of the impetus for antiAmerican attitudes. Unfortunately, most of the results for questions that focused on sources
of news resulted in contradictory or extremely weak correlations (Table 11). The most
important result was that people who watched an international news channel showed lower
levels of anti-Americanism (Table 11). There was a minute relationship between less sophisticated news sources (newspapers) versus the internet resulting in higher levels of antiAmericanism. However, this correlation was not robust and could have been inadvertently
confounded by the presence of the internet as a news source, which indirectly also asked
respondents if they had access to the internet. Therefore, this weak correlation may be the
result of exposure to the internet versus non-exposure. Regardless, the findings regarding
an international news channel suggest that Lambert is correct, sources of news and their
biases may in fact have an impact on anti-American attitudes around the world.
Regression
Now that each independent variable has been analyzed against the dependent variable,
the relative importance of each variable can be determined using regression analysis. For
each variable, one measurement question was selected for the regression, usually the variable with the strongest correlation to anti-Americanism. Controls were then added to eliminate noise in the data caused by regions and the Muslim faith.
Gender, being statistically insignificant, was recoded into a control for the purposes of
the regression model. Not surprisingly, given the relatively weak correlations in the data, the
dummy variables had the highest standardized betas (Table 10). The largest relationship
was the African dummy variable, which was negatively related to anti-Americanism. This is
probably due to the absence of US colonial history in that region, combined with the influx
of US aide to Africa. The Muslim/Non-Muslim and Middle East dummy variables were
almost identical, with betas of .166 and .164, respectively. This showed that while the
Muslim faith may have an impact on Anti-Americanism, it is almost impossible to separate
this from attitudes based on region or nation, neither proving nor disproving either side of
the theoretical debate over religions importance in conflict.
Overall, the regression model confirmed the direction of the relationships between the
independent and dependent variables suggested by the bivariate correlations, and also confirmed the weak nature of the relationships. The R squared value, while weak, was still statistically significant. While the weak statistical relationships are not ideal, in a global survey
of attitudes on this scale, weak numbers are to be expected.
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Further Research
Ideally, comparable data for income level and education would have been available to
provide a more complete picture of the economic relationship to anti-Americanism, but
that was not possible. Additionally, a more comprehensive scale for anti-Americanism could
be developed to account for relative deprivation. There is a distinct possibility that the lack
of strength in the results is due to the chosen measurement of the dependent variable. This
new Likert scale would need to include questions about globalization and imperialism in
general in order to better test relative deprivation theories and include questions that
directly address the United States, like the ones used in the present study.
In order to better address the origins of anti-Americanism, more theory needs to be
developed that directly addresses the phenomenon, in order to support the suggested
empirical continuations. As indicated in the literature review, this process should begin by
tying together existing literature related to globalization and ethnocentrism theories, social
identity theory, and theories related to individual attitudes. A more comprehensive literature, with testable hypothesis, would generate further studies of anti-Americanism allowing
for more substantial empirical results.
Conclusion
Since September 11, 2001, American policymakers and citizens have been hypothesizing about why people in other nations can develop such strong animosity towards the
United States. However, political theorists and empirical studies have failed to provide a
cohesive answer to this problem. This study attempted to fill in gaps left in the literature,
and to tie together theories in an empirical analysis of individuals around the world in
order to determine which of their characteristics provoke anti-American attitudes. While
early correlations showed promise in explaining relationships, the final regression analysis
proved the relationships between the independent variables (identity demographics) and
dependent variable (anti-Americanism) to be weak at best. However, even weak relationships that are statistically significant point to the potential for continuing research on antiAmericanism.
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Appendix 1:
Data from 45 Countries:
1. Angola
2. Argentina
3. Bangladesh
4. Bolivia
5. Brazil
6. Bulgaria
7. Canada*
8. China*
9. Ivory Coast
10. Czech Republic*
11. Egypt*
12. France*
13. Germany*
14. Ghana*
15. Guatemala*
16. Honduras*
17. India*
18. Indonesia*
19. Italy
20. Japan*
21. Kenya
22. South Korea*
23. Mali
24. Mexico*
25. Morocco (No data)
26. Nigeria*
27. Pakistan*
28. Peru
29. Philippines*
30. Poland*
31. Russia
32. Senegal
33. Slovak Republic*
34. South Africa
35. Tanzania*
36. Turkey
37. Uganda*
38. Great Britain*
39. Ukraine
40. United States*
41. Uzbekistan*
42. Venezuela
43. Vietnam*
44. Lebanon*
45. Jordan*
* Indicates one or more questions related to my independent variables was modified or not
asked within that country.
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Appendix 2: Variables and Corresponding Survey Questions
Dependent: Anti-Americanism
Questions 61b, 62, 65 (recoded), 67, 68
Independents: Identity Variables
Sources of News:
Questions 56, 57, 58, 59, 60 abc,
Gender:
Question 73
Age:
Question 74
Travel and Contact Abroad:
Questions 75, 76, 77, 78.
Religion:
Questions 79 (not asked in China)
80 (Muslim in Islamic Countries Only), modified in Tanzania, not asked in Egypt, Jordan,
and Lebanon.
81 (Non-Muslim or non-Islamic Countries), modified in Czech Republic, Great Britain,
Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Slovak Republic, South Korea, and Turkey. Not asked in China,
Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon
82 (Muslim in Islamic Countries Only), not asked in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Tanzania
83, modified in Great Britain, Mexico, Poland and South Korea. Not asked in China, Egypt,
Jordan, and Lebanon.
Education Level:
Question 84 (Recoded to standardize)
Question 85, modified in China, not asked in Egypt and US
Employment Status-Dropped from Study
Question 86, modified in China, India, South Korea, and US.
Availability of Necessities:
Question 87 abc, not asked in Egypt
Income Level-Dropped from Study
Question 88
LDC’s only:
Availability of amenities (Egypt not included)
Question 89 a (not asked in China, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic) b, c (not asked in
China), d, e
Population:
Question 97, modified in Canada, China, France, Germany, and Vietnam. Not asked in
Egypt, Great Britain, Guatemala, Honduras, Jordan, Lebanon, South Korea, Uganda, and US.

Availability of Necessities:
Question 87 abc, not asked in Egypt
Res Publica
Income
Level-Dropped from Study
Question 88
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Table 1: Education

Spearman's rho

AA

global education

Have formal education
only: How old were you
(will you be) when you
completed your full time
education, either at
school or at an institution
of higher education?

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

AA
1.000
.
22999
-.034**
.000
22999
-.088**
.000

22999

**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
Table 2: Availibility of Necessities

Spearman's rho

AA

Have there been times during the last year when you
did not have enough money to buy food your family
needed?

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Have there been times during the last year when you
did not have enough money to pay for medical and
health care your family needed?

AA
1.000
.
22999
.049**
.000
22999

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

.048**
.000
22999

Have there been times during the last year when you
did not have enough money to buy clothing your family
needed?

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
Table 3: Amenities (Lesser Developed Countries Only)

Table 3: Amenities (Lesser Developed Countries Only)
Spearman's rho

AA

Spearman's rho

AA

AA
Correlation Coefficient
1.000
Sig. (2-tailed)
Correlation Coefficient .
N
22999
Sig. (2-tailed)
Correlation Coefficient
-.088**
N
Sig. (2-tailed)
.000

LDC only: Does your
household have
LDC only: Does your
electricity?
household have N

Correlation Coefficient
19103
Sig. (2-tailed)

electricity?

LDC only: Does your
Correlation Coefficient
-.039**
N
household have a
Sig. (2-tailed)
.000
working LDC
TV? only: Does your
Correlation Coefficient
N

household have a
working TV?

Sig. (2-tailed)
N

19972

LDC only: Does your
household have running
water in the house?

Correlation Coefficient
-.092**
Sig. (2-tailed)
.000
N
19972
LDC only: Does your
Correlation Coefficient
LDC only:
Does
your
Correlation
Coefficient
-.100**
household have running
Sig. (2-tailed)
household
have
flush
water
in athe
house?Sig. (2-tailed)
.000
N
toilet?
N
19972
LDC only: Does your
Correlation Coefficient
LDC only: Does your
Correlation Coefficient
-.004
household have a flush
Sig. (2-tailed)
household have a car?
Sig. (2-tailed)
.614
toilet?
N
N
19972

LDC only: Does your

**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
household have a car?

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

AA
1.000
.
22999
-.088**
.000
19103
-.039**
.000
19972
-.092**
.000
19972
-.100**
.000
19972
-.004
.614
19972

.039**
.000
22999

Amy Buenning
Amy Buenning
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Table 4: Gender

Spearman's rho

AA

Gender

Amy Buenning

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

AA
1.000
.
22999
.000
.995
22999

Table 5: Gender Region 1, The Americas

Spearman's rho

AA

Gender

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

AA
1.000
.
4958
.042**
.003
4958

**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

Table 6: Gender Region 5, The Middle East

Spearman's rho

AA

Gender

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

AA
1.000
.
4026
-.047**
.003
4026

**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

Table 7: Population

Spearman's rho

AA

About how many people
live in the place the
interview was conducted?

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

AA
1.000
.
22999
-.035**
.000
17092

Res Publica
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Table 8: Travel and Contact Abroad

Spearman's rho

AA
1.000
.
22999
.007
.308
22999
.052**
.000
22999
.076**
.000
22999
.129**
.000
8958

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
In the last five years have you traveled to another country?
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Have you ever traveled to the US?
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Do you have friends or relatives who live in another country that you Correlation Coefficient
write to, telephone or visit regularly?
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
If have friends or relatives who live in another country that write to, Correlation Coefficient
telephone or visit regularly only: Do any of the friends or relatives
Sig. (2-tailed)
you write to, telephone or visit regularly live in the US?
N
AA

**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

Table 9

Anti-Americanism By Faith
11
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Table 10: Religious Activity

Spearman's rho

AA

Do you consider yourself as belonging to a particular
religion? If yes, which one?
Muslim in Islamic country only: How often, if at all, do you
pray?

Non-Muslim in Islamic country and non-Islamic countries
only: People practice their religion in many different ways.
Outside of attending religious services, do you pray several
times a day, once a day, a few times a week, once a week or
Muslim in Islamic country only: How often, if at all, do you
fast?
How important is religion in your life?

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

AA
1.000
.
22999
.126**
.000
22999
-.070**
.000
4773
.153**
.000
15379
-.006
.666
4773
.097**
.000
20719

**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

Table 11: Sources of News and Information

Spearman's rho

Where do you most often
turn to get news about
national and international
issues?

Correlation Coefficient

If has most frequent
source only: What is your
next most frequent source
of news about national
and international issues?

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)

Do you watch an
international news
channel such as (make
specific to each country)?

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Sig. (2-tailed)
N

N

AA
-.043**
.000
22999
.033**
.000
22889
.089**
.000
22999

AA

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

1.000
.
22999
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12: Regression Model for Anti-Americanism
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Appendix 4: Regression Model

Table 12: Regression Model for Anti-Americanism
Table 12: Regression Model for Anti-Americanism

Model Summary

Model
1

R
.393

R Square
.154

Adjusted
R Square
.154

Std. Error of
the Estimate
1.97668

ANOVA for Anti-Americanism

Model
1

Regression
Residual
Total

Sum of
Squares
16650.721
91213.093
107863.8

df
11
23344
23355

Mean Square
1513.702
3.907

F
387.406

Sig.
.000

Coefficients for Anti-Americanism

Model
1

(Constant)
Where do you most often
turn to get news about
national and international
issues?
How old were you at your
last birthday?
Have you ever traveled to
the US?
muslim dummy variable
gender dummy variable
global education
dummy region 2 Europe
dummy region 3 Asia
dummy region 4 Africa
dummy region 5 Middle
East
Have there been times
during the last year when
you did not have enough
money to buy food your
family needed?

Unstandardized
Coefficients
B
Std. Error
8.288
.122

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta

t
67.926

Sig.
.000

.136

.012

.071

11.102

.000

6.992E-03

.001

.051

8.077

.000

.355

.047

.048

7.496

.000

.790
-1.79E-02
-2.04E-02
.343
-.264
-1.084

.039
.026
.006
.042
.044
.042

.166
-.004
-.022
.063
-.047
-.218

20.016
-.685
-3.414
8.097
-5.996
-25.540

.000
.493
.001
.000
.000
.000

.937

.055

.164

16.987

.000

5.943E-02

.027

.014

2.170

.030
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